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The crisis of substance and the difficulty of decision 
Musil’s subject 
Abstract 
The crisis of substance and the difficulty of making decisions are fundamental cores in 
Musil’s conception of the subject. In The Man Without Qualities subjectivity is the conse-
quence of a precise ontology which deconstructs, in the manner of Mach, the very structure 
of reality. But Musil is not Mach, and he does not merely translate his categories into liter-
ature. There is a philosophical originality in his thought revealing a design in which the disso-
lution of substance and the unsaveability of the ego turn into the development of a para-
lysing “sense of possibility”. This essay restores an image of Musil fascinated by the theme 
of the undecidable, but also an acute critic of all the forms of ethical-political decisionism. 
1. Metaphysical dissolution, sense of possibility and indifference of qualities 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the fundamental cores of Musil’s 
philosophical thought following the literary deconstruction of the meta-
physics of the transcendental portrayed in The Man without Qualities1: the cri-
sis of substance and the difficulty of decision. Development of the theoret-
ical link between these two themes proceeds in Musil through metaphors 
and literary figures, but the connection is philosophically undeniable. In a 
context that has no substance – or only relative substantiality – deciding 
becomes difficult. Reality is reduced to a series of possibles, creating a situ-
ation in which decision is always lacking in support, lacking anything which 
can make it somehow definitive. 
                                                     
1 Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (Reinbeck-Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1952), hsg. 
Adolf Frisé, translated by Sophie Williams and Burton Pike: Robert Musil, The Man Without 
Qualities (Picador, 2011). From now on we will refer to this text by the abbreviation: Der 
Mann. We will always indicate first the page number of the original German edition, and 
in square brackets the page number of the English edition. If there is no indication in 
square brackets, this means that the passage does not appear in the English edition. 
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The most synthetic way to explain this germinal point in Musil’s thought 
is to be found in the figure of Bonadea, one of the characters in whom 
Musil’s irony becomes the most successful mirror of philosophy. If we 
know that «she was not lustful; she was sensual, as other people have other 
afflictions, for instance suffering from sweaty hands or blushing too readily» 
(Der Mann, p. 42 [39]), the decisive element in her profile concerns her 
worth as a witness to the sudden loss of meaning of traditional metaphysical 
discourse. Musil states that this strange mistress, among her other features, 
«could utter the words “truth, goodness, and beauty” as often and as casu-
ally as someone else might say “Thursday”» (Der Mann, p. 42 [39]). Coming 
from the lips of this young woman, the three transcendental properties of being, 
which represent the very image of a reality that is understandable because it 
is created, and as such is thought of rather than merely wished for by God, be-
come the expression of an empty discourse, a slogan. The aforementioned 
properties have an extraordinary metaphysical significance within them-
selves, capable of reducing the chance to a defect in human consciousness 
as well as denouncing the purely parasitic nature of evil; however, this be-
comes nothing more than a collection of words unable to describe reality 
and, perhaps, reassure the person uttering them2. 
Onto the “void” left by this deconstruction Musil grafts the fundamental 
contents of the philosophy of Ernst Mach3, “filling it up” with the dissolu-
tion of substance and the unsaveability of the ego, which translates into the 
development of a “sense of possibility” that is so final as to make any deci-
sion impossible. But if making a decision appears to Musil to become an 
extreme gesture, we will attempt to show how in his thought the theme of 
the impracticability of deciding has no “decisionistic” significance (as in the 
case of Musil’s acquaintance, Carl Schmitt). If anything, Musil’s ambivalent 
attitude towards the Machian criticism of the notion of substance becomes 
                                                     
2 In an attempt to show that Bonadea’s metaphysical system no longer had any rele-
vance to the concrete lives of his Viennese contemporaries, Musil in fact portrays the exact 
significance which, rightly or wrongly, the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had for 
those who were part of it: the direct transition from the great philosophical synthesis of 
the Middle Ages to the abyssal thinking of the twentieth century, in other words from 
overall stability to the restless precariousness of every single being and every single move-
ment. 
3 Musil’s The Man Without Qualities would not in fact be possible without the fragile 
image of reality as portrayed by Mach, whose thinking was the subject of Musil’s doctoral 
thesis in philosophy in the early twentieth century: Robert Musil, Beitrag zur Beurteilung der 
Lehren Machs (Berlin Wilmesdorf: Dissertationsverlag Carl Arnold, 1908), Robert Musil, On 
Mach’s theories (Washington Dc: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982). 
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the core for a solipsistic understanding of human relations which ultimately 
makes love impossible. 
The starting point for all this is in any case Mach’s dissolution of sub-
stance, followed by that of the ego: the subject as a conscious translation of 
substance does not exist. «Das Ich ist unrettbar», the ego is unsaveable4. This 
is the message that Musil receives from Mach, a message which renders 
normal and without any possible alternative the situation of unease that we feel 
with regard to those people whose identity appears in fact to be extremely 
fragile, decided by the course of events, undergone rather than wanted, so 
much so that it only takes a change in circumstances, in the people around 
them, to see them in effect as totally different and unrecognisable. That 
which in our experience appears to us as something exceptional and not, 
fortunately, as a characteristic of all men, in Mach becomes, unilaterally, the 
measure of every ego, reduced to a crossroads where new events are con-
stantly emerging. 
There could have been no more fertile ground for Musil’s thought. The 
reality which Mach describes, therefore, as a mere collection of Emp-
findungen, of elements and sensations devoid of any stability, becomes the source 
of the actual conceptual core of Musil’s novel: the sense of possibility. 
[…] if there is a sense of reality, and no one will doubt that it has its 
justification for existing, then there must also be something we can 
call a sense of possibility. Whoever has it does not say, for instance: 
Here this or that has happened, will happen, must happen; but he in-
vents: Here this or that might, could or ought to happen. If he is told 
that something is the way it is, he will think: Well, it could probably 
just as well be otherwise. So the sense of possibility could be defined 
outright as the ability to conceive of everything there might be just as 
                                                     
4 Ernst Mach, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen 
(Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1896, 1922) p. 19, translated by C. M. Williams and 
Sydney Waterlow: Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the 
Psychical (New York: Dover Edition, 1959), p. 24. Mach in effect also provides an “existential” 
explanation for his position, which is still understandable today to anyone who starts to 
reflect on the slowness with which, in normal, non-exceptional, circumstances, things (i.e. 
our experiences, expectations and labours) change during our lives; in fact – says Mach – 
it is above all the environment in which we live that pushes us towards continuity, subsi-
stence, permanence, since it almost abhors dynamism: «The apparent permanency of the 
ego consists chiefly in the single fact of its continuity, in the slowness of its changes. The 
many thoughts and plans of yesterday that are continued today, and of which our environ-
ment in waking hours incessantly reminds us […], and the little habits that are uncon-
sciously and involuntarily kept up for long periods of time, constitute the groundwork of 
the ego» (E. Mach, The Analysis of Sensations, p. 3). 
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well, and to attach no more importance to what is than to what is not. 
(Der Mann, p. 16 [10-11]) 
In The Man without Qualities reality breaks up into pieces, inasmuch as 
every objective thing is merely the casual and rigid realisation of its infinite 
potential possibilities. How the subject fits into a world conceived in this 
manner is made clear in the description of Ulrich, the protagonist of the 
novel, whose profile is so uncertain as to be inconsistent: «So without much 
exaggeration he was able to say of his life that everything in it had fulfilled 
itself as if it belonged together more than it belonged to him. B had always 
followed A, whether in battle or in love. Therefore he had to suppose that 
the personal qualities he had achieved in this way had more to do with one 
another than with him; that every one of them, in fact, looked at closely, 
was no more intimately bound up with him than with anyone else who also 
happened to possess them. Nevertheless, one is undoubtedly conditioned 
by one’s qualities and is made up of them, even if one is not identical with 
them, and so one can sometimes seem just as much a stranger to oneself at 
rest as in motion» (Der Mann, p. 148 [157]). 
Therefore radical inconsistency, contingency and accidentality become 
the ciphers of Musil’s subjectivity. These words, however, cannot be read 
as if they were a straightforward literary transposition of Mach’s thesis, for 
two distinct but significantly linked reasons. Firstly because Musil displays 
speculative originality with regard to Mach, so much so that he is even one 
of his critics. The second reason is that the point which interests Musil is the 
effect on human relations of this understanding of reality. So the interrela-
tion between these two issues needs to be shown. 
2. Musil as a critic of Mach 
Indeed, if we follow Musil’s discourse, at a certain point we find an out-
come that is inconsistent with the motive of unquestioning agreement with 
Mach. The interpretation of Mach’s arguments undergoes an evolution. 
Slowly but surely Musil distances himself from his original agreement as he 
undergoes two fundamental theoretical influences: Husserl’s thinking about 
Machian empirio-criticism and the psychology of Gestalt in relation to the 
ability to perceive forms, in the data of the senses, which have some stability5. 
                                                     
5 C. Monti, “La dissertazione su Mach: una ristampa italiana”, in Istituto Italiano di 
Cultura (a cura di), Robert Musil nel primo centenario della nascita (Innsbruck-Vienna, 1980), pp. 
92-101. 
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The outcome of this meditation becomes, as has been observed, the possibil-
ity of understanding «the isolated entity (the ego, the thing, etc.) at least as 
a function based on experience and perhaps no longer even a fiction, if one is 
prepared to consider its isolation and its “substantiality” in relative terms»6. 
In actual fact this is not an insignificant change. On the contrary, it is a 
fundamental one, and traces of it can be found in paragraph 39 of Der Mann, 
which opens with the statement contained in the title: «A man without qual-
ities consists of qualities without a man». In fact this thesis, which is the 
true thesis of the novel, is completely Machian in flavour: Ulrich, the thirty-
year-old protagonist, is not so much a man without qualities as a combina-
tion «of qualities without a man» (p. 148 [156]), without a subject, without 
substance one might say. However, since qualities, in order to exist, need 
someone to possess them (to use Aristotelian language: on the ontological 
plane they are still accidents), Musil’s real thesis (the pure amalgam) trans-
lates into the image which gives the work its title (the pure man). So in the 
choice of the novel’s title, a “substantialist” view, which Musil does not 
avoid, can still be perceived. This is a change of course, so to speak, which 
is an invitation to take a direct look at the doctoral thesis on Mach, a work 
which has not always been as well received as it deserves by the critics, who 
have tended to see it as a merely compilative and in a sense heteronomous 
contribution. While this may be true, Musil does show that he is an original 
reader of the father of empirio-criticism, so much so that he highlights a 
theoretically decisive aspect which is capable of destabilising its system and 
is rich in existential implications. 
Musil in fact sees very well in his book on Mach how Mach describes 
relationships involving substances as reciprocal and simultaneous func-
tional relationships which make it possible to express «dependence» on sub-
stance only in logical-mathematical, therefore unreal, terms7. And in effect 
this is the heart of Mach’s destruction of substance, which can be achieved, 
as Musil again shrewdly observes, only if substantial dependence can be ex-
pressed as the permanence «of a group of functional dependences, of reac-
tions which occur “here and there”», and not the permanence «of a spatio-
temporally individuated unity»8. Now Musil renounces precisely this point, 
and his criticism of Mach consists of achieving a concept of dependence that 
is much stronger than that of Mach, in the awareness (which is the theme 
of The Man without Qualities) of the extent to which the environment can 
                                                     
6 C. Monti, p. 99, our italics. 
7 Robert Musil, On Mach’s Theories, p. 47. 
8 Ibid, p. 50. 
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affect, in real terms and not just functionally, the subject’s life (to the point 
of annihilating the subject’s qualities). At the end of his analysis Musil writes 
that criticism of Mach cannot be considered complete if it is not understood 
that «mathematical dependence» is called upon to «give way to the real de-
pendence on which it is founded»9. The readmission of substance, in no 
matter how relative a sense it is to be understood10, is therefore a readmis-
sion of true dependence: this is the reason for the mathematical and func-
tional dependence, and not the other way around, and it cannot be avoided 
by logical-formal sublimation. The significance of the statement of the im-
possibility of what we have called a true “sublimaion” cannot be trivialised, 
since Musil is aware of its precise extent. If we read what he argued in his 
essay The Mathematical Man (1913), we find the argument that mathematics 
has a specificity that is unique in the whole panorama of human disciplines: 
it is «a marvellous spiritual apparatus designed to think of all possible cases 
in advance»11. Translated into existential terms, this means that mathematics 
is believed to constitute a way of knowing the course of events in advance 
and therefore of governing dependence upon reality and the unpredictable 
nature of human action. The reaffirmation of the primacy of real depend-
ence and of what takes place in space-time is not therefore an unimportant 
move – it means stressing once again the weight of what is real, stating the 
impossibility of the subject having control over experience, and making de-
cision impossible. 
This is the second reason why Musil does not merely translate Mach’s 
philosophy into literature: stressing the non-eliminability of real depend-
ence is decisive in the economy of his thinking, including reflecting about 
the significance of relationships. For what happens to relationships if the 
theme of the fragility of the ego is combined with the awareness of the 
strength of dependence which not even Machian economicism is able to re-
duce to a convenient mathematical-functional field that can be known (and 
dominated) a priori? 
                                                     
9 Ibid, p. 80. 
10 If the critics agree in viewing Musil’s rejection of the radicality with which Mach had 
seen in the category of substance «the illusory operation of linking one unintelligibility to 
another unintelligibility» – according to A. Gargani, Freud, Wittgenstein, Musil (Milano: 
Shakespeare and Company, 1982), p. 41 – it remains an open question whether the title 
chosen in any case by Musil for his novel is itself after all so weak and relative, and not, on 
the contrary, a very strong title (a substance without qualities is in fact pure substance!). 
11 This passage is quoted by Fabrizio Cambi to explain Ulrich’s love of mathematics, 
in the text: F. Cambi, “Sintassi delle sensazioni e costruzione dell’io”, in Robert Musil, I 
turbamenti dell’allievo Törless, trad. it. di F. Cambi, pp. 9-30, note 22, p. 387. 
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3. The failure of love: singularity as a rejection of diversity 
In order to answer this question we must examine the love affair be-
tween Ulrich and his «forgotten» sister Agathe, the incestuous sexual rela-
tionship which is one of the key points in The Man. Relationships are always 
also dynamics of dependence, and what Musil portrays is the thesis of the 
impossibility of love, inasmuch as every subject has to depend on a subjec-
tivity which is irreversibly different from his/her own. If this is seen as the 
starting point for a solipsistic approach that has been kept carefully con-
cealed, it has to be noted that it originates precisely from Musil’s criticism 
of Mach: ultimately dependence cannot be eliminated. 
Musil presents incest as the quest for (and in a sense the pretence of) a 
more real dimension of the subject, in which the meeting with the other, 
instead of destabilising him, strengthens him, inasmuch as it is the result of 
«a lover who will be the same as yourself and yet someone else, a magical 
figure that is oneself, […] and yet with the advantage over something we 
merely imagine of having the breath of autonomy and independence» (Der 
Mann, p. 905 [982]). If the otherness of the other person (or one’s own 
otherness in relation to the other) is always the reason for the possibility of 
the failure of the relationship, Musil portrays in Agathe a double of the pro-
tagonist who is able to overcome that failure: «But you see, even if you want 
to love someone as yourself, and no matter how great your love for that 
person, this love still remains a deception […] because you cannot feel, it is 
simply not possible to feel how his head or his finger ache» (Der Mann, p. 
1200, our translation). «Die unbeeinflussbare Beschaffenheit der Körper», «The un-
questionable structure of bodies» (Der Mann, p. 1060, our translation) – an 
expression worthy of study in terms of philosophical anthropology –, and 
the otherness which it manifests, means the defeat of love. And it is this 
defeat that Musil wants to overcome by eliminating the distance between 
the other and the subject – thus anticipating in one fell swoop the Lacanian 
theses that were to identify the failure of love with its eminently egotistic 
nature (inasmuch as in Lacan’s view man’s desire is, as is well known, to see 
his own desire loved, rather than to love the other – hence egotism is the 
universal enemy of human relationships). 
If, as we have tried to show, Musil is ambivalent about the notion of 
substance, it is precisely at this point that his ambivalence emerges very 
clearly. The persistence in Musil of the category of substance is made clear 
precisely in relation to what he himself refers to as the «unquestionable 
sttructure of bodies». Meeting the other does not mean meeting relation-
ships, a mere series of sensations and elements, but rather the undeniable 
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consistency of a body which acts by causing resistance and dependence in 
the subject. That is why, ultimately, substantiality is not eliminated in Musil 
– even though his statement remains ambiguous. 
What happens in fact if dependence on the other coincides basically with 
dependence on oneself, because the other is me and his/her otherness is, 
in conclusion, more illusion than reality? Musil’s answer is that it is to be 
“assumed that every agitation in one soul would also be felt by the other, 
even though whatever evoked it was going on in a body that was not, in the 
main, one’s own. An embrace, for instance – you are embraced by way of 
the other body. […] You may not even want it, but your other self floods 
you with an overwhelming wave of acceptance» (Der Mann, pp. 908-909 
[986]). Now, if the theme of excitement and the embrace requires precisely 
the consistency and sustantiality of another body, Musil’s position remains 
ambivalent, half-way between Mach and his rejection. Indeed, as has been 
demonstrated12, incest between brother and sister is the literary metaphor 
for an ethical-anthropological form of solipsism which attempts to elimi-
nate otherness in order to ensure the consistency of subjectivity, in a con-
text that is so explicit as to lead Musil to the extreme hypothesis13 that his 
forgotten sister is a total invention and not a real character at all14. 
                                                     
12 A. Rendi, Robert Musil, a cura di F. Cambi (Trento: Editrice Università degli Studi di 
Trento, 1999), p. 115; the text is a reprint of the 1963 edition by Edizioni di Comunità – 
Milano. 
13 Ibid, p. 118. «In some existences the unreal, invented sister is nothing other than the 
ineffable youthful form of a need for love […]. In the lives of some others it is solitude 
[…], an imaginary double full of acrobatic grace which reduces the anguish of solitude to 
the tenderness of a solitary cohabitation. And the only thing to be said about some natures 
is that this imagination […] is nothing but the most distilled egoism and self-love; a desire 
beyond measure to be loved, which has formed a shrewd alliance with gentle altruism […]. 
It [the image of the sister] purely and simply represents love and is always the sign of a 
tense and unsatisfactory relationship with the world» (Der Mann, quoted by Rendi p. 118). 
14 Though it is not improbable «that in a final version of this chapter and of the passage 
in which Urlich denies that Agathe has any corporeal reality, this ruthless sincerity would 
have been either veiled or eliminated» (Ibidem), the fact remains that in Musil’s intention 
Agathe is ultimately not even real. The origin of the solipsistic choice thus becomes clear: 
the dependence of freedom on reality is also the reason for the danger to which the subject 
is exposed in his quest for realisation, in his demand for consistency. Hence the need to 
make the subject, through solipsism, independent of reality, so that it can cease to be the 
source but above all the sum of the problems of human initiative. It is that particular form 
of solipsism which is also present in an author such as Weininger, a form which is disturb-
ing in philosophical terms not only because it is not primarily gnoseological (but ethical-
anthropological) in nature, but also because it represents a paradoxical desirability of sol-
ipsism itself, by distancing it fom the image of a sceptical nightmare which makes it so 
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So Musil stages the typically contemporary drama of the inability to val-
orize the otherness with its burden of ambivalent dependence, as if the very 
modern stress on subjectivity had been compelled to end – although in fact 
this outcome is not mandatory – by closing in on itself, in a fragility of 
relationships, and the discovery of singularity could only lead to the rejec-
tion of diversity. 
And so we come to the final point in our work: the link between the 
sense of the possibility and that of the impossibility of deciding. For a man, 
such as the man without qualities, permanently in thrall to the contrasting 
sense of alternative possibilities, deciding becomes impossible, inasmuch as 
– as the Latin etimology (decaedere) and the German etimology (entscheiden) 
both remind us – decision is called upon in any case to make a cut, to ex-
clude, to cut out, to give a complete and definite shape to the numerous 
different possible courses of action. Although in this way decision tends to 
become an extreme gesture, in Musil, however, all this in no way entails an 
ethical, or worse a political, theory of a decisionist nature. In conclusion, 
therefore, let us look at this final point, which cannot be outlined without 
mentioning the name and the work of Carl Schmitt. 
4. Criticism of decisionism despite the inability to decide 
As we have said, Musil and Schmitt knew and respected each other, to 
the extent that Musil granted Schmitt the really significant privilege of read-
ing the draft of his novel. Schmitt himself announced this in a letter dated 
8th April 1975, to Frisé, the editor of Musil’s Tagebücher: «my personal meet-
ing with Musil in Berlin came about solely as a result of my exclusive interest 
at that time (1930) in the figure of Walther Rathenau15» – the man on whom 
Musil based the figure of the second man without qualities in the novel, Paul 
Arnheim, the personification of a pathological inability to decide – «it was 
only on the basis of this perspective (which for Musil was restrictive) that I 
was also able to read at that time the draft of the novel, which I obtained 
through Franz Blei»16. 
Now although this is not the appropriate time for a systematic examina-
tion of the relationship between Musil and Schmitt, at least one aspect of 
                                                     
familiar in philosophical literature. Cf. on this point A. Musio (2010), “Il solipsismo della 
libertà. Da Musil a Weininger”, Studia austriaca, XVIII: 97-123. 
15 To whom Schmitt dedicated a review in 1912 entitled “Zur Kritik der Zeit”, Die 
Rheinlande: 323-324. 
16 The text of the letter is quoted by Frisé in Robert Musil, Tagebücher (Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1976), 2 voll., hsg. Adolf Frisé, vol. II, p. 1200, our translation. 
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its philosophical significance needs to be mentioned. What Musil and 
Schmitt have in common, as we have said, is the theme of decision or, rather, 
of the crisis of decision. All Musil’s characters suffer from the inability to de-
cide, and the only decisions they make are, at best, those of an action parallel 
to reality, or a year of leave from life: «at no time has the difference between the 
expert’s experience and that of the layman been as great as it is now […]. It 
is only on the problems of being human that everyone feels called upon to 
decide [«zur Enstcheidung berufen»], and there’s an ancient prejudice to the effect 
that one is born and dies a human being!» (Der Mann, pp. 214-215 [231, our 
translation]). 
As is well known, the question of decision is the quintessence of 
Schmitt’s political philosophy, which identifies sovereignty with the ability 
to decide on the state of exception17 and from that point on hands over to 
politics the burden of decisionism, naming it for the first time. However we 
judge it, Schmitt’s thought is not easy to manage because with it politics 
loses any ideal guise of constructing the common good and becomes – if we 
may be permitted to synthesise it in little more than a single line – the brutal 
task of distinguishing between friend and enemy which assigns to power 
the role of deciding what is normal and what is not, with the final claim to 
determine legitimately who is homogeneous and who is a danger18. 
And yet decisionism itself cannot be interpreted as an inescapable des-
tiny. Indeed, the comparison with Musil reveals that it is nothing more than 
decision becoming problematic19: deciding is in fact somethimg absolutely 
normal and customary in everyday life, not at first sight a moral or legal-
political theory. If decision becomes decisionism, it is because there has 
been a transition from a perfectly everyday experience, practised and prac-
ticable by everybody, to something exceptional which a fragile, or even to-
tally missing, subjectivity is unable to bear. It is not without significance to 
                                                     
17 «Sovereign is he who decides on the exception», this is the famous striking opening line of C. 
Schmitt’s 1922 volume, Political Theology. Four chapters on the concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005), 1° ed. 1985, p. 5. 
18 In actual fact we have never really been relieved of this burden. Not only did it 
survive the whole of the 20th century, but it still emerges today with the primacy – pre-
dicted by Schmitt – of finance, economics and technology over the reduced power of states 
and the crisis of politics in general. 
19 And it needs to be stressed how ultimately in Schmitt, in perfect analogy with the 
inverse relationship between qualities and subject in Musil, it is precisely the decision that 
constitutes the sovereign subject, and not the latter that exists before the decision. Cf. on 
this point A. Musio, Etica della sovranità. Questioni antropologiche in Kelsen e Schmitt (Milano: 
Vita e Pensiero, 2011), chapter 2. 
The crisis of substance and the difficulty of decision. Musil’s subject 
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mention on this topic the aphorism that “decision is simply the art of being 
cruel in time” (H. Becque) – a form of cruelty (assuming that is what it is)20, 
which Musil’s subjects are unable to practise. 
Therefore, if it is true that in the passages where Musil describes the 
pathological inability to bring a decision to its conclusion, in the back-
ground there is an interweaving that links Musil to Schmitt and takes us 
back once again to Mach – since the elements dissolve the unitarian and 
something is always missing for the decision21 – the differences have to be 
noted. Musil and Schmitt do not belong in the same way to the German 
conservative ideology of the 1920s and 1930s. Although “the urgency of 
decision” is one of the «vital components of the conservative belief in the 
primacy of the political and in the need to distinguish between friend and 
enemy»22, Musil, does not in fact go down this path. Musil’s arguments on 
politics in his Tagebücher, which really do run counter to Schmitt, in fact 
provide valuable testimony to the fact that «Musil does not deny the expe-
riences underlying» the theory of Schmittian decisionism – the difficulty of 
making a decision, the lack of direction in a disorientated cultural and social 
context – «he simply regards them as unilateral»23. If the theme of the ina-
bility to decide is present in Musil himself, in him «the extreme situation, to 
which the decision is the response, does not appear in itself to be a criterion 
for defining the political, since if anything it reveals or realises its “error”»24. 
Decisionism in fact presupposes an anthropology which Musil finds reduc-
tive25 and a function, through the declaration of the dangerous nature of 
man, of the political aggressiveness of the nationalism26 which he rejects. 
Musil, in other words, does not make decision a gesture so extreme as to 
stake everything on homogeneity and on the political definition of normal-
ity and of the enemy, even if it is true that Schmitt could not fail to feel at 
                                                     
20 This argument is unhesitatingly supported by Derrida, for whom decision is what 
makes justice impossible both personally and politically. Cf. on this point J. Derrida, L’autre 
cap (Paris: Minuit, 1991). 
21 G. Tihanov, “Robert Musil in the Garden of Conservatorism”, in P. Payne, G. Bar-
tram, G. Tihanov (eds. ), A Companion to the Works of Robert Musil (New York: Rochester, 
2007), pp. 117-148, p. 145. 
22 Tihanov, p. 128. 
23 F. Maier-Solgk (1991), “Musil und die problematiche Politik Zum Verhältnis von 
Literatur und Politik bei Robert Musil, insbesondere zu einer Auseinandersetzung mit Carl 
Schmitt”, Orbis Litterarum 46/3: 340-363, p. 355, our traslation. 
24 Ibid, pp. 355-356, our traslation. 
25 Ibid, p. 356, our traslation. 
26 Ibid, p. 358, our traslation. 
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ease in the presence of a mass of pages, such as that which constitutes the 
structure of Der Mann, devoted to the description of the abyss of decision. 
Therefore the attempt by Musil to make a distinction between the an-
thropological experience of the difficulty of deciding and ethical-political 
decisionism is one of the fundamental keys to thinking even about the cur-
rent western Lebensform in philosophical-moral terms. For Musil, crisis of 
decision and crisis of responsibility go hand in hand, by virtue of a connec-
tion which is in some way institutionalised in our civilisation through tech-
nology and the “social division of labour”. For Musil, both of them are at 
the origin of that phenomenon which he referred to with an apt expression 
as «Indirektheit»27, in other words that configuration of relationships whereby 
it is possible to give «the signal for war with the clearest conscience in the 
world», even if the person giving the signal «as a man may be incapable of 
shooting down an old dog … This system of indirection [“indirect respon-
sibility”] elevated to an art is what nowadays enables the individual and so-
ciety as a whole to function with a clear conscience; the button to be pressed is 
always clean and shiny, and what happens at the other end of the line is the business of 
others, who for their part don’t press the button» (Der Mann, p. 938 [696]). 
Musil cannot have imagined how topical these words of his were to be-
come in the era of nuclear weapons, when it only takes the press of a button 
to unleash the most massive destruction that has ever been possible (and 
the words just quoted above can only be read today with this understanding 
in mind). But the invitation to reflect on the conditions of possibility of 
decision, in a global context – in which responsibility is divided and dis-
persed into a thousand apparently self-referential streams, and in which 
technology with its own logic radically changes people’s lives before they 
can even realise it – is one of the tasks that Musil’s philosophical thinking 
has assigned to the contemporary world. It is only in this way that the world 
can avoid becoming a “world of qualities without man”. 
                                                     
27 In fact we have to speak of “indirect responsibility” because Musil means “eine Er-
scheinung in hohem Grad unabhängig vom Persönlichen” (Der Mann, p. 638), in other words the 
emergence of a form of action almost wholly independent of any personal dimension. 
